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 I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and 
express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a 
meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but 
you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science, what-
ever the matter may be.   
Lord Kelvin (1891, p72-72) 
1. Conceptual background 
A useful definition of a problem is that it is a situation where there is a current 
state, and a desired state, and they are not the same.  Most people are familiar 
with this sort of situation and many day to day problems can be dealt with by 
largely subconscious or automatic processes (the coffee is too bitter, so I add 
sugar; the water is too cold, so I turn the tap).  But some problems (I want to take 
up a new hobby, perhaps a new sport, a new language, or a new instrument) re-
quire reflection: I have to reflect what goals I want to achieve and whether the 
actions I have at my disposal will help me achieve them.  In such cases I have to 
build a mental model of my problem to organize my thoughts and help me 
choose wisely. Other problems, even more complex, involve the significant oth-
ers in my life (where should we go on holiday?; should we move to a new city, or 
new country, to take that new job?): in these cases, the model I build should be a 
shared one, so as to ensure that all those involved in the problem understand 
what they are getting into.  At a higher level still, society has to take important 
decisions about responses to threats to our environmental and economic wellbe-
ing and security: in a democracy these decisions should take account of the views 
of the public in some organised fashion. 
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Tackling problems at multiple levels therefore, requires models of value and 
models of (our knowledge of) the world around us which may be to a greater or 
lesser extent implicit or explicit depending on the background nature of the prob-
lem.   These models can also be more or less complex.  For example, in the event 
of an uncontrolled emission of radioactive materials from a nuclear plant into the 
atmosphere, the core decision may look as shown in Table 1, where the rows are 
the choice of actions, the columns are scenarios which may be realized and the 
consequences in the cells are the outcomes experienced by humanity.  This is a 
very simple model.  At the other end of the scale, there are much more complex 
models (e.g. Geldermann et al, 2009).  Such systems may allow (probabilistic) 
forecasting of wind direction, and model the dispersion of radionuclides and the 
consequent damage to human health.  These more complex models may require 
drawing on extensive amounts of data and cutting-edge science. 
To whom should we go when we wish to deliberate on these models?  In the case 
of models of the world around us, it seems reasonable to privilege experts  W 
those who have relevant knowledge about the subject matter - above lay mem-
bers of the public.  However, identifying these experts may not be straightfor-
ward.  Senior professors may have long since ceased to keep up with the re-
search literature and be primarily expert at obtaining research funding, and 
managing grants.  Industry experts may be blinkered by social norms and con-
flicts of interest, especially if they depend for employment or consulting income 
on other powerful stakeholders.   Moreover, if we want to make a genuinely in-
formed decision, we want experts who are able, not just to offer an opinion, but 
to give us an assessment of how much confidence we can have in their assess-
ment.  This requires a cognitive ability which is entirely distinct from actual 
knowledge.   
We may seem to be on safer ground when it comes to models of value. In these 
cases, surely the person to engage with on whether the value model is the deci-
sion maker?  Yet this is not a particularly helpful observation.  In many situations 
there is no single unitary decision maker. Even if one person has to sign on the 
dotted line, the agreement of many people is required if the decision is to be real 
 W is actually to result in action and change.   What is more, research strongly sug-
gests that even when making consequential decisions people do not know the 
goals that they have  W even if asked to spontaneously list their goals, there are 
many other not less important goals which they also recognize as being relevant 
to their choices (Bond, Carlsson, and Keeney, 2008). Therefore, it is wise to en-
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gage in reflective dialogue with their friends and partners about significant choic-
es  W even if the decision falls to you alone.   
Table 1.  A simple model of a decision in nuclear emergency management 
  Scenarios 
  Wind blow seawards 
are radioactive material 
is dispersed over the 
ocean 
Wind blow land-
wards and radio-
nuclides are dis-
persed over land 
Actions Evacuate nearby 
town 
Unnecessary evacua-
tion with result cost 
and hardship 
Population are 
moved out of the 
ƉĂƚŚŽĨŚĂƌŵ ?ƐǁĂǇ 
Do not evacuate 
but encourage 
people to shel-
ter indoors 
  Damage and incon-
venience both mini-
mised 
 Population are ex-
posed to potential-
ly hazardous levels 
of radiation 
 
This book is a book about elicitation, which may be defined as the facilitation of 
the quantitative expression of subjective judgement, whether about matters of 
fact or matters of value.  Why should anyone want to express their judgements 
quantitatively, or to help others to do so?  So far, we have stressed the role of 
models in underpinning decision making.  But these models are often  W and al-
ways in the case of models which are exclusively mental models  W qualitative in 
nature: the human mind has not evolved to do floating point operations.   
We believe that people should be encouraged to express their judgements quan-
titatively as a way of making their thoughts precise, and ensuring that they are 
testable against the evidence from the real world.  StatemenƚƐ ůŝŬĞ  “dŚŝƐ ǇĞĂƌ
ƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞĂůŽƚŽĨƌĂŝŶŝŶ'ůĂƐŐŽǁ ?Žƌ “ƌƚŝƐƚŝĐƐĞůĨ-realisation is more 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŽ ŵĞ ƚŚĂŶ ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ĂƌĞ ŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐůǇ ǀĂŐƵĞ P  “dŚŝƐ ǇĞĂƌ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă  ? ?A?
ĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ? ? ?ŵŵŽĨƌĂŝŶ ŝŶ'ůĂƐŐŽǁ ?ĂŶĚ “/ǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚo 
take a pay cut of up to £7K per annum to free up a day a week for my theatre 
ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉ ? ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚĞƐƚĞĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚƵĂůrealized weather and my actual 
choices respectively. 
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For important decisions, this clarity is critical, we believe, if we are to have high 
quality, transparent engagement of experts and stakeholders; if we seriously care 
about having high quality deliberative dialogue.  It is not that words and qualita-
tive reasoning are not important.  However, significant decisions inevitably in-
volve weighing competing risks and values and questions of relative magnitude 
inevitably arise.  The only way to communicate clearly about relative magnitude 
is through the use of number.  For such decisions, words and numbers are jointly 
necessary and indeed, complementary. 
It is true that people are not (yet) accustomed to use numbers to express their 
judgements of fact or value. For some people this is difficult or uncomfortable; 
others have an ideological objection to it, as they view quantification as having a 
technocratic flavour.  Yet we believe that the difficulties are overstated.  As the 
chapters in this book show, there are many ways to enable people to express 
their quantitative judgements, which can be customised to quite different cogni-
tive styles and tastes.  Many of the elicitation methods we review involve asking 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƉƵƌĞůǇƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ PƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐĂƌĞ ?ƐŽƚŽƐƉĞĂŬ ? “ďĂĐŬĞĚ
ŽƵƚ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ?
Our purpose in this section has been to present our motivating philosophy and 
the conceptual underpinnings of the current volume.  In the remainder of this 
chapter, we discuss in more detail the need for, and barriers to, using elicitation 
of probabilities and preferences to support decision making, outline the chapters 
of the book, and in conclusion, present some common themes and ways forward. 
2. The need for and barriers to elicitation 
For the purposes of sharpening assumptions and distinguishing them, noth-
ing beats an exercise in probability. (Neustad and Fineberg, 1983, p.118) 
 Values are what we care about.  As such values should be the driving force 
ĨŽƌŽƵƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ƵƚƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚŝƐ ?/ƚŝƐŶot even close to 
the way it is.  (Keeney. 1992, p.3) 
2.1  The need for elicitation of judgement 
In this subsection, our aim is to reflect on the need for elicitation. We do so by 
considering cases where elicitation was or could have been profitably used. 
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These in-depth cases will give a sense of the breadth of potential application 
across time and across domains.  Specifically we deal with four areas of applica-
tions, which are depicted in Table 2 below: they cover human health (swine flu); 
provision of public services (airport location); natural hazards (assessment of the 
risk of earthquakes) and environmental protection (in the case of radioactive 
waste).  Although all cases involve both uncertainties about matters of fact 
(probabilities) and conflicts about values (preferences), two case studies are bet-
ter used to highlight the former, and the other two, the latter. 
Table 2.  Four case studies which illustrate the potential for structured elicitation 
 Assessment of probabilities Assessment of prefer-
ences 
Historic (1960s/ 70s) Case 1. Swine flu Case 2. Airport location 
Recent Case 3. Assessment of risk of 
earthquake 
Case 4. Radioactive waste 
   
Case 1.  Swine flu. 
In early February 1977, then US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Jo-
seph A Califano Jr was confronted with the decision to release stocks of influenza 
vaccine; he had been in post for two weeks.  The vaccine had been used in au-
tumn 1976 to begin immunizing the nation against swine flu, a strain of the H1N1 
influenza, and possibly prevent an epidemic on the scale of the Spanish flu which 
ĐĂƵƐĞĚƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨ ?A?ƚŽ ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞǀĂccine had 
been withheld due to possible but not certain links with Guillain-Barre Syndrome, 
which is an often paralyzing and sometimes killing side effect. This unenviable 
time pressured task of decision making under uncertainty concerned trading be-
tween rŝƐŬƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů “ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚůĂďďĂƐĞĚĞx-
periments did not exist and as such must rely on expertise.   Today, the outbreak 
is most remembered for an unnecessary mass immunization that cost $135 mil-
lion (Harrell 2009). The virus resulted in one fatality while side-effects from the 
vaccine are thought to have caused 25 deaths due to Guillain-Barre syndrome 
(Roan 2009).  There is no guarantee that decision making under such circum-
stances will result in the best outcome post-hoc, however better processes for 
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working with expert judgement seem to have been needed. 
Much has been written on this outbreak with the most in-depth critique of the 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ  “The Epidemic That Never Was: Policy Making & The 
^ǁŝŶĞ &ůƵ ĨĨĂŝƌ ? (Neustad and Fineberg, 1983), published after the event with 
the aim of learning lessons for the future.  While there are a number of con-
founding issues that led to the decision to attempt to vaccinate the entire US 
population a key shortcoming identified in the process was the lack of probability 
assessments, explicitly identifying the need for experts to quantify their uncer-
tainty in terms of probability, exposing their judgment for comparison with one 
another. 
Case 2.  Airport location 
A perennial issue in UK politics over the last several decades has been airport ca-
pacity planning in the crowded South-East of the country around London.  An in-
structive episode in this history is the Roskill Commission (Hall, 1980) appointed 
by the UK government in 1968, and which reported in 1971.  The centerpiece of 
ƚŚĞ ZŽƐŬŝůů ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐReport was a highly detailed economic cost-benefit 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? “ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚŽƵďƚƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚĂŶĚŵŽƐƚĐŽŵƉůĞǆŽĨŝƚƐŬŝŶĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚĂn-
ywhere ? W Hall, 1980, p 32) which involved calculations and monetisation not on-
ly of capital investment and passenger time, but also noise impacts, agricultural 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞ ?dŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŽĂƐŝƚĞ  W Cubling-
ton  W between London and Birmingham as the best choice.  However the publica-
tion of the report and the substantive recommendation of Cublington generated 
a storm of controversy.  One commission member wrote an impassioned note of 
ĚŝƐƐĞŶƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞŶƚŝƌĞ methodology had been misguid-
ed as it completely ignored the overriding importance of preserving open coun-
ƚƌǇƐŝĚĞ ?  ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ DŝƐŚĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? “tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ǁƌŽŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ
ZŽƐŬŝůů ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ^ĞůĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ?( “EŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ŽŶ ƐƚŝůƚƐ ?) piled into the discussion with 
trenchantly expressed take-downs of the study methodology.  An important 
theme of the Mishan and Self critiques is that the Roskill Commission calculations 
embed disputable and critically important assumptions social values, such as eq-
uity. In large part because of a disconnect between the values embedded in the 
cost-benefit analysis and political and popular perceptions, the Roskill recom-
mendation of Cublington was ultimately rejected and the government chose to 
explore the option of building an airport at Foulness.   
The experience of the Roskill Commission is a reminder that complex decisions 
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ĂƌĞ  “ǁŝĐŬĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?  ?ZŝƚƚĞůĂŶĚtĞďber, 1973) and feature conflicting stake-
holders, with multiple, competing, objectives.  Effective analyses have to grapple 
with these features of the problem context rather than wish them away.  It is in-
teresting to contrast the mode of analysis of the Roskill Commission with the 
Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) described in Keeney and Raiffa (1976) for 
the location of the new Mexico City airport. This very early decision analysis 
(originally reported in 1972) nevertheless features the use of computerised sensi-
tivity analysis to explore and communicate the model, in order to assist decision 
makers to reflect on their value judgements. 
Case 3.  Assessment of the risk of earthquake 
IŶĞĂƌůǇƉƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĞĂƌƚŚƋƵĂŬĞƐƚƌƵĐŬ> ?ƋƵŝůĂ/ƚĂůǇŬŝůůŝŶŐ ? ? ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?^ŝǆƐĐi-
ĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚŽŶĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůǁŚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶ/ƚĂůǇ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŵŵŝs-
sion for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks six days prior to the earth-
quake were sentenced to six years in prison in October 2012 for manslaughter.  
The prosecution argued that the expert advice from the Commission resulted in 
30 people deciding to stay indoors which resulted in their death.  The case led to 
outrage from many in the scientific community who argued that earthquakes 
cannot be predicted with certainty, so the trial was seen by some as an attack on 
science.  The prosecuting attorney Fabio Picuti was not criticizing the experts on 
these grounds, rather on a lack of evaluation of the degree of risk present in 
> ?ƋƵŝůĂ ? ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐ ũƵĚŐĞMarco Billi ruled the analysis was superficial.  An 
appeal in November 2014 resulted in all six scientists being acquitted and the 
government official having his jail sentence reduced to two years, on the grounds 
that only the government official was responsible for the communication of the 
risk assessment that led to the death of the 30 individuals.  For details see Nature 
(2011) and Science (2012 and 2014) 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ> ?ƋƵŝůĂƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨ ĞĚďǇůĞƐƐĂŶĚƌŽDĂr-
telli and Lalliana Mualchin who were respectively the President and General Sec-
retary of the International Seismic Safety Organisation (ISSO) concerned the dan-
gers of the lack of independence amongst expert judgments (Martelli and 
Mualchin 2012).  This tragedy highlights a need for transparent, rigorous and 
widely accepted processes for assessing uncertain events.   
Case 4.  Radioactive waste management 
In 2003 the UK government set up a Committee on Radioactive Waste Manage-
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ŵĞŶƚ ?ŽZtD ?ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh< ?ƐŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌǇŽĨ
radioactive waste.  This problem was not new, but acquired new urgency as the 
current fleet of nuclear reactors was coming to the end of its life and government 
wanted to commission new nuclear power plants in order to ensure continuity of 
generating capacity.  However, previous efforts to arrive at a solution  W involving 
 “ĚĞĞƉĚŝƐƉŽƐĂů ?ŽĨ waste stocks in a deep underground repository had left a leg-
acy of popular distrust of the nuclear industry and of the government.  CoRWM 
was asked to take a new alternative approach  W open and participative, and ca-
pable of inspiring public confidence. 
Early on, CoRWM decided that they would systematically involve a broad range 
of stakeholders and conduct as much as possible of their business in public.  
However, a challenge was how to reconcile this with the need to actually reach a 
decision which all members of the committee (who brought a diverse range of 
views) could actually sign up to.  One of the strengths of the CoRWM process was 
their use of a systematic MCDA as a core (though not the only) component of 
their deliberative strategy (Morton et al, 2009).  The MCDA model provided a 
transparent basis through which different concerns  W for example about safety, 
or about the need to avoid a burden on future generations  W and stakeholder 
perspectives could be discussed and weighed up against each other.  The MCDA 
also played a key role in communicating the rationale for the decision in the final 
report (CoRWM, 2006).  Thus, CoRWM provides a good example of how explicit 
elicitation and modelling of value tradeoffs can play an important role in support-
ing complex societal decisions.    
2.2 Why do people resist expressing their uncertainty and values quantitatively? 
It is sometimes argued that attempting to employ analytic methods in situations 
which are characterised by uncertainty and conflict over objectives reflects a 
technocratic arrogance in the face of a fundamentally uncertain, unpredictable 
world and/ or a profane disregard for the role of human values in decision mak-
ing. As examples of the former, Black Swans (Taleb, 2007) and Perfect Storms 
(Junger, 1997) are two metaphors used to describe rare events about which 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ  “ĚĞĞƉƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽƋƵĂŶƚŝĨǇ.   As an example of 
ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌdĞƚůŽĐŬ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?3) discussion of  “ƐĂĐƌĞĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ? P “A sacred val-
ue can be defined as any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly 
treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes com-
parisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular val-
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ues ? ?Tetlock et al, 2000, p 853).   
We believe thĂƚĂƉƉĞĂůƐƚŽ “ĚĞĞƉƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?Žƌ “ƐĂĐƌĞĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ?often reflect la-
zy, superficial thinking about both possible future events and human objectives.  
Again, we frame our discussion through four case studies: Deepwater Horizon 
and the Fukushima nuclear disaster for deep uncertainty; the approval of new 
drugs and the concept of capability in military planning.   
Deep uncertainty Case 1: Deepwater Horizon.   
In April 2010, a geyser of seawater erupted onto the BP Deepwater Horizon rig 
located in the Gulf of Mexico resulting in the largest offshore oil spill in US histo-
ry; eleven platform workers were killed and seventeen injured. The National 
Academy of Engineering and National Research Council (2010) argued early indi-
cations of the problem existed from several repeated tests of well integrity.  Bea 
(2010) attributes the cause stemming from the failure of multiple processes, sys-
tems and equipment.  While this event may appear as a Black Swan as we have 
never experienced such an event before, it was not beyond the boundaries of 
reasoned imagination (3DWp&RUQHOO 2012), as early warning signals were present.  
To model this is possible: we would require an assessment not only of each event 
but the dependency between events, where all the events which precipitated the 
disaster are made more likely through a certain management style.       
Deep uncertainty Case 2: the Fukushima disaster 
In  March 2011, an earthquake in Japan resulted in the release of seismic energy 
into a place of convergent boundaries of tectonic plates, i.e. a subduction zone, 
causing a tsunami that reached 14m.  The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors 
which were designed for a maximum wave height of 5.7m, were affected by the 
tsunami, resulting in nuclear meltdowns and release of radioactive material.  The 
plants design was deemed safe as the likelihood of a wave in excess of 6m was 
less than 0.01 in the next 50 years, although historical evidence of such extreme 
waves existed albeit from the 9
th
 and 17
th
 Century (Paté -Cornell 2012).  Moreo-
ver, while the buildings were designed to withstand a tsunami, the plants backup 
generators were not (Masys 2012).  This event illustrates how analogous events 
for which data exists could inform the identification of events and the assess-
ment of the associated uncertainty on events.   
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Sacred values Case 1: the approval of new drugs 
Some of the hardest values to think about systematically are values which relate 
ƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨůŝĨĞĂŶĚ ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
most of our healthcare is provided by third parties, either governments or insur-
ance funds, there is a need to make tradeoffs since not all medical technologies, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůĂƌĞĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞ ?One tool for structuring 
such tradeoffs is the Quality Adjusted Life Year or QALY (Pliskin et al, 1980).  
QALYs provide a numerical assessment of health benefit which integrates quality 
of life and survival.  Roughly speaking, QALYs are calculated via a quality of life 
score, which reflects different dimensions of quality of life such as level of pain, 
mental distress or mobility, multiplied by length of life.  Over the last two or 
three decades QALYs (and their variants) have becomes widely used and accept-
ed in many jurisdictions (Drummond et al, 2015), with the precise parameters 
used to calculate the QALYs being elicited from local populations to reflect local 
preferences.  The success of the QALY in ensuring that public spending on medi-
cines is in line with social values shows the potential of a simple, yet theoretically 
robust concept in making previously taboo tradeoffs discussable in the public 
sphere.  
Sacred values Case 2: the concept ŽĨ ?ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶmilitary planning 
A common way in which values become sacred in organizational management is 
where values are specified at an insufficiently strategic level.  Protection of exist-
ŝŶŐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐďĞĐŽŵĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚǁŝƚŚůŽǇĂůƚǇƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐĚŝvision of the organisa-
tion and accepting reallocations becomes identified with surrender.  Addressing 
such issues requires creating an overarching conceptual framework in which the 
contribution of individual programmes to the common good can be traced and 
articulated.  In businesses, profitability often provides this framework but in oth-
er sorts of organisations, the path to constructing such a framework might be 
less obvious.  A good example of such a framework in a non-business setting is 
ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ  “ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŝŶ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
such as the UK, US, Australia and Finland (Anteroinen, 2012).  The idea in such 
frameworks is to substitute arguments between individual services about how 
many ships, tanks, or planes with arguments about how to deliver particular ca-
pabilities: for example a monitoring capability may be delivered by human re-
connaissance, UAVs or satellites. Once this substitution has been made, it is pos-
sible to reframe decisions away from being about which branch of the service 
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suffers and towards what constitutes the best way of delivering the ability to 
meet national military needs. 
Reviewing the above cases, we freely admit that eliciting probabilistic or tradeoff 
information may be difficult: but we argue that the proper response is not to de-
clare that the problems are somehow too profound for quantitative thinking to 
be useful, but rather to think carefully and creatively about what the difficulties 
are and how to tackle them.  With this motivation, the rest of the book repre-
sents a sourcebook of methods and concepts for doing this. 
3. Overview of the book 
dŚĞŝĚĞĂĨŽƌƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞK^dĐƚŝŽŶ “ǆƉĞƌƚ:ƵĚŐŵĞŶƚEĞƚǁŽƌŬ P
Bridging the Gap Between Scientific Uncertainty and Evidence-Based Decision  
DĂŬŝŶŐ “ ?1 noting the importance of using sound elicitation processes when 
building models to inform decision making. Elicitation may be needed to popu-
late models of uncertainty, interacting with subject experts, but they may also be 
needed to set up models of preferences, interacting with experts, decision mak-
ers, and other stakeholders. In both cases, it is important that analysts and ex-
perts follow process that allows them to think clearly about numbers, whether 
they concern probabilities or they concern the importance of attributes, for in-
stance. Hence, this book covers elicitation processes having in mind both proba-
bilities and preferences. 
A first major group of chapters in this book (Chapters 2 to 9) focusses on pro-
cesses to elicit uncertainty from experts. Chapter 2, by Quigley, Colson, Aspinall 
and Cooke, presents the Classical Method for aggregating judgements from mul-
tiple experts concerning a probability distribution; the method uses mathemati-
cal aggregation based on the performance of experts. In Chapter 3, Cooke dis-
cusses the issue of validation: what constitutes good uncertainty assessment and 
how can this be measured. This chapter addresses in particular the Classical 
Method, for which many studies have already been carried out. Chapter 4, by 
Gosling, presents the Sheffield elicitation framework, also to elicit probability dis-
tributions, covering its foundations, its extensions, and its applications. In con-
trast to the Classical method, a behavioral aggregation method is proposed in 
                                                          
1 http://www.expertsinuncertainty.net/ 
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this chapter.   Chapter 5, by Hanea, Burgman and Hemming, outlines a protocol 
named IDEA, which is a mixed approach combining behavioral and mathematical 
aggregation techniques that can be used instead of, for example, the well-known 
Delphi protocol. The two ensuing chapters present approaches based on the 
principles of Bayesian updating of probability distributions. Chapter 6, by Hartley 
and French, discusses how one might use a full Bayesian model to combine the 
judgements of multiple experts into a posterior distribution, considering prior 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƐ ĚĂƚĂ ? /Ŷ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ? ? YƵŝŐůĞǇ ĂŶĚ tĂůůƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĂŶ Ăp-
proach to represent expert uncertainty through analogies with existing empirical 
data so reducing the burden of quantification on experts. 
Chapters 8 and 9 address important issues that are of relevance for different 
probability elicitation approaches. Chapter 8, by Werner, Hanea and Morales-
Nápoles, discusses the main elements of structured expert judgement processes 
for dependence elicitation, when eliciting multivariate distributions using either 
pooling or Bayesian approaches. Chapter 9, by Wilson and Farrow, discuss how 
mathematical methods for expert judgement aggregation, whether opinion pool-
ing or Bayesian methods, can incorporate correlations between experts; they al-
so consider behavioral approaches and the potential effects of correlated experts 
in this context. 
A second major group of chapters in this book (Chapters 10 to 14) focusses on 
processes to elicit preferences from stakeholders or decision makers. The elicita-
tion processes covered here consider situations in which a decision maker (or a 
group) needs to make a decision. The purpose of the elicitation is then to build a 
model of the preferences of the decision maker (and often, preferences of other 
stakeholders) that helps this decision maker in making sound and informed deci-
sions. The first two chapters on preference elicitation deal with problems under 
uncertainty. Chapter 10, by Gonzalez-Ortega, Radovic, and Ríos Insua, presents 
the classical decision analysis paradigm of utility theory, to elicit models of pref-
erences that can be combined with models of uncertainty. They cover the case of 
preferences concerning one attribute, multiple attributes, and the preferences of 
adversaries. In Chapter 11, Bordley presents a different perspective on utility elic-
itation based on targets, which allows using probability elicitation methods to 
elicit utility functions.  
Chapters 12 to 14 address the elicitation of preferences independently of, or in 
the absence of, any uncertainty elicitation. These chapters concern preferences 
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over multiple attributes or evaluation criteria. In Chapter 12, Morton presents 
the multiattribute value theory, from its foundations to process aspects im-
portant in practice. Chapter 13, by Matsatsinis, Grigoroudis and Siskos, is based 
on the same theoretical grounds, but introduces a new outlook on a very differ-
ent elicitation paradigm, which involves eliciting preferences indirectůǇ ?  “Ěŝs-
ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŶŐ ? ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŵĂŬĞr is able to make at an holistic 
level into the components of a multiattribute value function. In Chapter 14, Dias 
and Mousseau discuss the elicitation of an outranking-based preference model, 
considering in particular ELECTRE methods, which are based on principles that 
are different from the value measurement framework of the preceding chapters. 
Chapters 15 and 16 are about cross-cutting issues that are relevant for elicitation 
of uncertainties as well as for elicitation of preferences. In both cases, the ex-
perts or stakeholders involved can incur into biases leading to answers that, upon 
reflection, they would wish to revise. In Chapter 15, Montibeller and von Winter-
feldt overview the biases that individuals and groups are subject to, and also 
what might be done to reduce the occurrence of such biases. Chapter 16, by Bol-
ger, addresses another issue present in any elicitation process involving expert 
judgement, which is the selection of the experts. This chapter presents a struc-
tured process having in mind mainly probability elicitation, but it is also relevant 
for preference elicitation. 
The last group of chapters illustrates how some of the approaches presented in 
this book can be, and are being, applied in practice. In Chapter 17, Barons, Wright 
and Smith describe an integrating decision support system for probabilistic 
judgement elicitation (under a Bayesian approach), and they illustrate its poten-
tial on a food security case in the UK. Chapter 18, by Soares and Bojke, illustrates 
expert elicitation in health care decision making, discussing two examples of for-
mal elicitation to inform Health Technology Assessments in the UK. Chapter 19, 
by Merrick and McLay, demonstrates an expert judgment based method using 
pairwise comparisons and parameter estimation to elicit nuclear threat risks con-
cerning the security of US ports. In Chapter 20, Porthin, Rosqvist and Kunttu pre-
sent a risk assessment concerning a new logistics system for a pulp and paper 
manufacturer in the Nordic countries, using a computer system designed to sup-
port decision-making (i.e. that can also be used to elicit preferences). Chapter 21 
differs from the previous applications In that it deals with elicitation of prefer-
ences rather than uncertainties, but it also considers a situation involving a group 
of individuals. In this chapter, Delias, Grigoroudis and Matsatsinis present a case 
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study of applying a multicriteria disaggregation approach to elicit a model of 
preferences for crop planning in a Greek region. 
 4. Conclusions and Future Directions 
As we have emphasised in our initial section, we see the aim of elicitation as be-
ing to facilitate the quantitative expression of subject judgement, not as an end 
in itself, but to facilitate high quality dialogue and reflection about important de-
cisions.  As we stress in the historical survey in our overview of the chapters 
themselves, we think there is now a vibrant applied discipline which draws on a 
rigorous and well-developed theoretic base, and which has provided us with a 
toolbox of techniques, each custom-developed to meet the needs of particular 
sorts of problems and the preferred cognitive styles of different sorts of people. 
The philosophy of this book is that quantification, through elicitation, is a way to 
refine and clarify the mental models which people inevitably use in thinking 
about complex problems. Quantification enables clearer communication about 
these models between people  W all sorts of people  W but also sharpens the pre-
dictions which these models make about the world and enable them to be tested 
empirically.  A book on this subject is (in our view) particularly timely because of 
the following trends in the world. 
x Increasing range of choice. Our experience of the world is increasingly medi-
ated through digital technologies which are global in reach.  This means that 
we are routinely confronted with choices broader than ever before.  A trivial 
example is that we are now able to download virtually any book in print from 
Amazon onto my Kindle reader: our choices about our education, career, po-
tential political or religious beliefs, choice of life partner, etc, have been simi-
larly broadened. We need aids which will help us organise and make sense of 
these complex choices, and which will enable us to weigh, select and aggre-
gate, and ultimately make better and more life-enhancing decisions.   
x Increasing availability of data.  As more transactions are conducted online 
and as the cost of data storage and processing drops, businesses and gov-
ernments have been increasingly able to collect, process, and make available 
large volumes of data relating to their activity. Unfortunately, gathering data 
does not itself bring insight, and in the absence of a strong research design, 
making inferences about what caused what, and the generalising from then 
and there to now and here can be extremely difficult. To build meaning from 
this data requires somehow infusing the data with expert judgement.      
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x Increasing demands for accountability.  During the debate prior to the 2016 
Brexit referendum, the UK politician DŝĐŚĂĞů'ŽǀĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “peo-
ple in this country have had enough of experts ? (Financial Times, 2016).  
tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞŝƐƐƵĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĂƚƌĞĨĞƌĞn-
ĚƵŵĐůĞĂƌůǇǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞĚ'ŽǀĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ PƚŚĞh<ǀŽƚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐĚŝĚŶŽƚƚƌƵƐƚƚŚe ex-
perts who predicted that leaving the EU would be a disaster, or the elites 
who purported to take decisions in their best interests.  A technological soci-
ety cannot survive without experts, or without political officeholders, but lay 
people may reasonably demand confidence that expert judgements - and 
claims to expertise - are as open to scrutiny and testing as possible, and that 
the values which inform public decisions are subject to open and transparent 
debate.  
The tools in this book have a vital role meeting all of these challenges: empower-
ing purposeful decisions in the face of these overwhelming choices; making sense 
of vast, complex and ill-structured datasets; and building bridges between ex-
perts and elites on the one hand, and (perhaps rightly) suspicious lay people on 
the other. 
Elicitation is a young technology.  Other quantitative technologies  W counting, 
measurement of physical dimensions  W have been around for millennia.  Yet oth-
er quantitative technologies  W cost accounting for example  W have become well 
established in the space of a few decades when it became clear that they met a 
need of a modern complex industrial society. There is the potential for elicitation 
of value and uncertainty to have a no less central role in the society of the future. 
We hope that this book will give the reader some ideas as to how that might 
come about.  
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